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Affirmative action in higher education
is in peril-judicially, politically, and in the
court of public opinion. A series of federal
court decisions have cast a constitutional pall
over many of the nation's affirmative action
policies. In 1992, rejected applicants-asking
for both injunctive relief and monetary dam-
ages-sued the University ofTexas School of
Law and its dean, claiming that the school's
admissions policies constituted illegal reverse
discrimination. In 1997, nearly identical suits
against the University ofWashington and the
University ofMichigan were filed by lawyers
from the Center for Individual Rights, an
organization that has emerged to provide legal
aid to individuals who feel they have been
wronged by affirmative action policies. In
November 1998, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Wessmann v Gittens, invalidated
the prestigious Boston Latin School's affirma-
tive action policy, even though ajudicial order
had once been required to ensure the school's
desegregation.' More suits are planned, and
according to one anti-affimative action attor-
ney involved in the litigation, "It's like shoot-
ing fish in a barrel.'2
Affirmative action is under attack in the
political arena, too. California spearheaded the
movement in 1996 with Proposition 209, a
voter-mandated prohibition on the use ofrace-
based affirmative action policies by govern-
ment entities. Washington State followed with
Initiative 200 in November 1998. In addition,
legislators in more than a dozen states have
introduced anti-affirmative action bills in the
last 2 years. This increasing judicial and politi-
cal activity reflects a decreasing popular com-
mitment to broad-based affirmative action
policies.3 A 1997 Washington Post-ABC
News survey found that "only one in six
whites but nearly half of all blacks believe
that minorities should receive preference in
college admissions."4 Given the current
social and political climate, medical schools
may soon be called upon to defend their com-
mitmnents to racial balance through admissions
practices. Although there are a number of
complementary grounds on which to defend
affirmative action, the most tenable will be a
revitalized articulation of the importance of
diversity in medical practice and education.
AffirmativeAction and the Law
Any law or action by any state entity
must meet the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, which holds
that "no state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." Governmental actions that take race
into account are deemed inherently "suspect"
under Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
Race has been designated a "suspect" classifi-
cation by the courts because one of the chief
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment is to
eliminate long-standing official, state-based
discrimination against African Americans;
because de jure discrimination based on race
has traditionally been seen to connote inferior-
ity; and because victims of racial discrimina-
tion by the state are sometimes less able than
other victims of discrimination to seek relief
through the political and electoral system and
thus warrant special judicial protection. As a
result, state actions involving classification,
differentiation, or discinuination based on race
must meet an especially heavy burden-the
"strict scrutiny test" (e.g., see references 5-8).
Under the strict scrutiny test, a state
classification based on race is presumed to be
unconstitutional unless the state entity can
show that the classification is necessary to
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further a "compelling state interest." The
state must also show that the state action in
question is narrowly tailored to meet that
compelling state interest. A court will weigh
the efficacy of altemative remedies, the flexi-
bility and duration of the policy, the relation-
ship between the program's numerical goals
and the percentage of minorities in the rele-
vant population, and the impact of the pro-
gram on the rights of innocent third parties.8
Under the strict scrutiny test, state legislation
that discriminates against minorities has
invariably been declared invalid.i7
Some scholars and judges endorse a
lower level of constitutional scrutiny-the
"intermediate level of scrutiny"'9"10-when
the state action represents an attempt to bene-
fit minorities. They argue that the original
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the historical experience of racial minorities
justify special protection for these groups. If
such a standard were adopted by the federal
courts, programs designed to benefit racial
minorities would be easier to defend than
those that work to the detriment of racial
minorities.
The current judicial trend, 112 however,
reflected in the Supreme Court's decisions in
Richmond v Croson (1989)'3 and Adarand
Constructors, Inc v Pena (1995),14 has been
to apply the strict scrutiny test to state action
that is friendly to minorities, such as affirma-
tive action, in the same way that it is applied
to state action that is hostile to minorities.
Observers who support the use of the strict
scrutiny test for any state action that uses race
as a factor assert that it is impossible to
advantage one race without disadvantaging
the less favored races. Unadulterated equality
before the law, they argue, should be the
benchmark of state action; otherwise the con-
stitutional protections embodied in the equal
protection clause would be subject to the ebb
and flow oftemporal political sentiment.
A change ofcourt personnel or the evolu-
tion ofjjurisprudence may diminish the impor-
tance of the strict scrutiny test in evaluating
state action,'5 but in the short term at least,
strict scrutiny is the measure that must be met
by medical schools and other state entities that
use race to help choose students.'6
Meeting the Current Legal
Standard
Admissions policies that establish quo-
tas or set-asides will not pass constitutional
scrutiny. These policies have been prohibited
since the Bakke case'7 and are now rare or
nonexistent. (Alan Bakke, a White man, chal-
lenged the affirmative action policy of the
University of California-Davis School of
Medicine. Justice Lewis Powell joined with 4
other justices to hold that race-based numeri-
cal quotas violate both the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thus Bakke must
be admitted. However, Powell also joined
with other justices to conclude that race, in
some situations, might legitimately be con-
sidered as long as admission was not based
solely on that factor.) The absence of quotas,
however, does not guarantee that a particular
policy or practice will be affirmed; neither
does the claim that race is only one of a total-
ity of factors that influence admissions deci-
sions. Bakke states that race may be used as a
"plus factor" in admissions considerations,
but if that plus factor is determinative in
individual cases it must still face the strict
scrutiny test.
Disappointed nonminority applicants or
activist opponents of affirmative action might
attempt to demonstrate that race is being used
as a determining factor by gaining access to
an institution's application files, either through
the discovery process, in the event that litiga-
tion has been initiated, or through the relevant
state's open records or freedom ofinformation
acts (e.g., see references 18-22). Applicants'
race, grade-point averages, standardized test
scores, and residency can be evaluated by
means ofsuch statistical techniques as logistic
regression and discriminant analysis to dis-
cover whether race plays a deterimining role in
the institution's decisions to admit students.
The policy or practice that is shown to use
race as a determiniing factor will be presumed
to be unconstitutional unless the institution
demonstrates (1) that the policy or practice is
motivated by a "compelling state interest" and
(2) that it is narrowly tailored to achieve that
state interest.'6
Remedying the Effects ofPast
and Current Discrimination
Courts have acknowledged that affirma-
tive action programs may satisfy the com-
pelling state interest requirement if they are
intended to remedy the continuing effects of
past and present discrimination. But although
African Americans and other minorities have
suffered tragically from discriminatory prac-
tices in this country, medical schools may
find it difficult to justify affirmative action
policies on these grounds. Courts have con-
sistently held that a desire to correct the
effects of general "societal discrimination" is
not a compelling state interest sufficient to
justify the strict scrutiny test.'3'23 To show a
compelling state interest, the state must iden-
tify specific discrinination by a governmen-
tal entity.
Courts may allow medical schools to
demonstrate that their policies are intended to
remedy the continuing effects of past dis-
crimination in grades kindergarten through
12 ofthe relevant state's public education sys-
tem. But this approach, too, may pose diffi-
culties to medical schools defending chal-
lenged affirmative action practices. Many
medical schools, relying on Bakke, estab-
lished their policies years ago and did not
base their affirmative action programs
explicitly on attempts to remedy past dis-
crimination.'6'24'25 Therefore, it is unlikely
that medical school or state policymakers
will possess evidence that demonstrates the
continuing effects of discrimination through-
out the relevant state's public school system;
they never saw the need to collect it.26
Providing courts with evidence of dis-
crimination against the cohort of students cur-
rently applying for admission to medical
schools may also be difficult. Many of those
students entered the public school system in
the early 1970s, a period marked by manda-
tory desegregation through busing and by rela-
tively aggressive civil rights enforcement poli-
cies with regard to public school enrollment.27
As a result, although racism and discrimina-
tion still limit the opportunities ofminorities in
very real ways, it may be difficult to generate
evidence ofthe sort ofsystemic discrimination
in a public school system that requires a rem-
edy at the level of professional education.
Even if such evidence were collected, it is not
clear that courts would accept it to justify a
policy retrospectively.28
These evidentiary hurdles, combined
with the now relatively consistent application
of the strict scrutiny test by the Supreme
Court and federal circuit courts, may under-
mine a medical school's defense of race-
based affirmative action practice on the basis
of the continuing effects of discrimination.
Consequently, although the concept of diver-
sity in medical school education is in jeop-
ardy, it may ultimately provide the most valu-
able and practical legal defense ofaffirmative
action in medical education.
The Courts and Diversity
One of the earliest and fullest examina-
tions ofthe diversity justification appeared in
Bakke in 1978. In Bakke, Justice Lewis Pow-
ell explained that the medical school's desire
to create a diverse student body to provide
more physicians for underserved minority
populations did not constitute a compelling
state interest. Powell noted that there was
insufficient evidence in the record that the
medical school's special admissions program
was needed or that it was likely to promote
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the stated goal of the program. However, he
offered another reason why the pursuit of
diversity might satisfy the compelling state
interest test. Diversity, he asserted, is vital
for the "robust exchange of ideas." Thus,
according to Powell, the selection of diverse
students who would contribute to an intellec-
tually vibrant academic community was a
constitutionally permissible goal.17(pp313-3l15)23
The constitutional meaning of diversity in
higher education has never again been ana-
lyzed in a Supreme Court majority opinion.
This paucity ofjudicial analysis and
precedent has endangered the diversity justifi-
cation as challenges to affirmative action pro-
grams became more common.'5 The diversity
justification was attacked directly in Taxman v
Board ofEducation ofPiscataway (I996)9 and
Hopwood v Texas (1996).12 In Hopwood, the
Fifth Circuit Court applied the strict scrutiny
test to the University ofTexas law school's affir-
mative action policies and emphasized that
Powell's elevation of diversity as a compelling
state interest in Bakke was never joined by
the majority of the court. As a result, accord-
ing to the Hopwood court, Powell's swing-
vote opinion in Bakke did not represent the
position of the Supreme Court or the law of
the land. 124'94"-44) In short, diversity in higher
education did not represent a compelling state
interest. Hopwood has binding legal force
only in the Fifth Circuit (Texas, Louisiana, and
Mississippi), but many observers, including
the dissenters, have warned that the "radical
implications ofthis opinion, with its sweeping
dicta, will literally change the face of public
educational institutions throughout Texas, the
other states of this circuit, and this nation."30
Even if the Hopwood ruling is ultimately
deemed a mistaken reading of the Supreme
Court's position, the diversity rationale clearly
needs rejuvenation.3
The Case ofPrivate Medical
Schools
Most of the leading affirmative action
education cases have involved state rather
than private institutions. Consequently, it is a
matter of some speculation whether the fore-
going discussion applies with equal force to
private medical schools that attempt to imple-
ment affirmative action programs. The equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies to state action. Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 196432 prohibits discrimi-
nation by private entities that receive federal
funds. Although there is no definitive case
law specifically relating to affirmative action
programs at private educational institutions
that receive some manner of federal funds,
courts have held that the test for purported
Title VI violations is the same as that applied
under the equal protection clause ofthe Four-
teenth Amendment.
Significantly, benchmark cases such as
Bakke and Hopwood were brought under both
Title VI and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
Private institutions in the jurisdiction covered
by Hopwood have assumed that the case's
mandate applies to them as well as their public
counterparts.33"P82) Thus, according to Chris-
topher Edley, who reviewed national affirma-
tive action policies for the Clinton administra-
tion, "it is reasonable to expect that after
Croson and Adarand the question will be
whether the [private] entity has a compelling
interest and whether the affirmative action
measure is narrowly tailored."28P69) There are
potential arguments to be made that Title VI
challenges might and should be viewed differ-
ently from Fourteenth Amendment claims.
But for now, it is likely that the same strict
scrutiny test will be applied to private and state
educational institutions that attempt to enact
affirmative action admissions policies.
Defending Diversity
The constitutional argument in favor of
diversity as a "compelling state interest" in
medical schools may be imperiled, but it is not
moribund. There is scattered support for the
doctrine in a number of Supreme Court rul-
ings. Although the observation was not a part
of its holding, the Supreme Court majority in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc v FCC observed that
"a diverse student body contributing to a
robust exchange of ideas is a constitutionally
permissible goal on which a race-conscious
university admissions program may be predi-
cated."34 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in a
concurring opinion in Wygant v Jackson
Board ofEducation, noted that "a state inter-
est in the promotion of racial diversity has
been found sufflciently 'compelling' at least
in the context of higher education, to support
the use of racial considerations in furthering
that interest."23tp286) No federal court, includ-
ing the Hopwood court, has ever stated
unequivocally that diversity can never be con-
sidered a compelling state interest. Instead,
courts have held that the goal of diversity as
articulated in particular factual contexts is not
compelling, or that insuffilcient evidence has
been marshaled to demonstrate its compelling
character. Thus, diversity may still represent a
compelling state interest if it is properly
explained and supported by the relevant legis-
lature or governmental entity.
In medical education, the special nature
of the doctor-patient relationship, society's
growing understanding of the complexity of
race relations in the United States, and the
quantitative and qualitative evidence that has
become available in the last 20 years may help
make the case that diversity is a constitution-
ally legitimate motive for enacting an affir-
mative action program. There are 3 related
grounds on which diversity might be consid-
ered a "compelling state interest" in medical
education: (1) that it will increase the number
of physicians who serve traditionally under-
served patients and specialty areas, (2) that it
promotes the robust exchange of ideas in med-
ical education, and (3) that it will result in bet-
ter medical care for minority patients.
Increasing the Number of
Physicians in UnderservedAreas
and Practice Specialties
There is now some empirical evidence
highlighting the potential role of minority
physicians in increasing the health status of
the nation, which was not the case at the time
of Bakke. Komaromy et al. recently found
that African American and Hispanic physi-
cians cared for a larger percentage of minor-
ity patients than did their White counterparts
and that they were more likely to practice in
communities with insufficient numbers of
primary care practitioners and to care for
Medicaid patients and uninsured patients.35
Similarly, in 1993, the American Association
of Medical Colleges reported that 39.8% of
medical school graduates from underrepre-
sented minorities reported that they intended
to practice in underserved areas, compared
with only 9% of other graduates.36
These studies and others3740 constitute a
growing body of evidence that minority
physicians may play an important role in
advancing the overall health of the nation's
citizens. These data could be augmented with
statistics generated at individual medical
schools that track the career paths of their
minority physician graduates. For both eco-
nomic and humanitarian reasons, states and
state entities have a compelling interest in fur-
thering the health of their citizens. Therefore,
with sufficient documentation, a medical
school might be able to contend successfully
that affirmative action programs that place
more minority physicians in the medical
workforce serve a compelling state interest.
It is possible, though, that individual
courts will not view the available empirical
evidence, some ofwhich is equivocal, as suf-
ficient. Even if a court agrees that increasing
the number ofminority physicians serves the
compelling state interest of improving the
health of underserved populations, the means
dised to achieve that compelling state interest
must be 'nrrowly tailored" to further that end.
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For example, a medical school that defends an
admissions policy on the grounds that more
physicians are needed for underserved popu-
lations might also have to demonstrate that no
alternative race-neutral means of reaching
that end are available.
A defense of diversity on the grounds
that minority physicians are more likely to
bring primary care to underserved popula-
tions is precarious on other grounds. Many
minority medical students do wish to practice
in underserved areas as primary care physi-
cians. Some, however, want to practice medi-
cine in non-primary care specialties and in
areas ofthe country that are not underserved.
Society should be wary of any policy that
suggests that minority physicians should be
directed into any particular geographic area,
type of neighborhood, or medical specialty.
Such observations do not mean that diversity-
based policies cannot be justified on the
grounds of providing primary care to under-
served populations, but the vulnerability of
this argument should encourage supporters of
affirmative action programs to seek out sup-
plemental reasons why diversity is a com-
pelling state interest.
The Robust Exchange ofIdeas
Supporters of the diversity justification
for affirmative action might also consider
rejuvenating Powell's assertion in Bakke that
diversity is a compelling state interest because
it helps students develop more sophisticated
interpersonal skills by forcing them to interact
with people of different perspectives.'7 Fed-
eral courts have acknowledged the utility of
diversity in law enforcement agencies that are
responsible for working with diverse popula-
tions (for example, see reference 41). Similarly,
a critical mass of minority medical students
may provide their nonminority colleagues with
insights into the racially and culturally based
concerns of future patients. Daily contact with
students of different backgrounds-contact
that includes discussions about the clinical,
social, and ethical aspects of patient care-
may help nonminority physicians serve the
needs of their minority patients in the future.
The goal ofbetter patient care represents
ajustification that is far more constitutionally
compelling than mere intellectual enrichment
for medical students. But in a political and
jurisprudential environment that is increas-
ingly suspicious of race-based remedies, it is
important to possess evidence that diversity
actually helps to achieve this goal. Such evi-
dence may be elusive. Moreover, even if a
court finds that a diverse educational envi-
ronment leads to better patient care by sensi-
tizing nonminority students, the medical
school will be asked to demonstrate that the
race-conscious policy is narrowly tailored to
achieve that goal. For example, has the med-
ical school considered other, race-neutral,
means of awakening its nonminority students
to the concerns and needs of their future
patients who may be minorities? Would
workshops, discussion groups, speakers, or
the use of standardized patients be equally
effective in preparing nonminority physicians
to care for diverse patient populations? (See,
for example, Lum and Korenman.42 )
Better Patient Care: The Most
Compelling State Interest
Diversity in the medical profession is a
compelling state interest because only it can
ensure that minority populations will receive
adequate health care. The state has not only
an interest in producing but a duty to produce
physicians who can engage in therapeutic
relationships with their patients that are based
on mutual trust-a requirement for optimum
delivery of health services. The historical
experience of minority groups, especially
African Americans, with the medical profes-
sion is very different from the experience of
nonminorities, and as a result they view
encounters with medical professionals in a
fundamentally different way than do nonmi-
nority patients.
Annette Dula has argued that "[flrom
slavery times to the present, US descendants
ofAfrica have harbored ajustified mistrust of
medicine and medical research [that] cannot
be simply written offas paranoia or hypersen-
sitivity.""3(p347) This distrust has its origins in
antebellum slave culture, in which White
physicians were viewed as owing allegiance
to the slave owner rather than to the slaves
who were their patients."'45 The ambivalent
relationship between organized medicine and
African Americans continued after emancipa-
tion. The medical profession played a role in
developing late 19th-century racial theories
insinuating that Blacks were physiologically
different from and evolutionarily inferior to
Whites.46'47 This view ofAfrican American
biology and physiology helped inspire the
now infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study, in
which medical research was conducted on
Black men without their consent and they
were denied access to beneficial treatment.48
The role of researchers' exploitation and mis-
treatment in helping to shape the African
American view of the medical establishment
can hardly be overstressed.49 At the same
time, throughout the first halfofthe 20th cen-
tury medical institutions and the medical pro-
fession implicitly and explicitly supported a
segregated medical delivery system that typi-
cally provided African Americans with sepa-
rate and unequal care.Y052
The medical slights and harms born of
racism have not been forgotten in the post-
segregation world. According to historian
Vanessa Northington Gamble, "there is a col-
lective memory among African Americans
about their exploitation by the medical estab-
lishment."49(p"775) The distrust generated by
this legacy can endanger the doctor-patient
relationship and the comfort level African
American patients feel with nonminority
physicians. A number ofstudies have demon-
strated that minorities clearly prefer to be
treated by physicians drawn from their own
ethnic groups.53
Minorities' distrust of the medical pro-
fession is rooted also in their perception of
the contemporary health care system. There
is growing and credible evidence that health
professionals continue to treat minorities dif-
ferently from nonminorities in ways that
undermine their health status.54 One study
found that primary care physicians who care
for predominantly minority patients "were
less likely to follow guidelines from nation-
ally recognized organizations for health pro-
motion and disease prevention" than were
physicians who care for predominantly Whitepatients.55 Another found that the rates for
ambulatory care visits, mammography, and
immunizations were lower for Black patients
than for Whites at every income level. Other
research reveals lower utilization rates for
African Americans for ordinary components
ofbasic medical care, such as laboratory tests
and x-rays.56
African American patients are more
likely than White patients to report that their
physicians did not express concern for their
pain and failed to provide them full informa-
tion about their examination findings, test
results, diagnoses, medications, and prenatal
care.57'58 In one study, race was associated
with less timely follow-up by physicians after
an abnormal screening mammogram.59 Other
studies have found that African Americans
are more likely than Whites to be hospital-
ized for avoidable conditions6o and that, once
hospitalized, they may receive a lower quality
of care and be less stable at discharge than
other patients.56'61 African American patients
are less likely than White patients to receive
hip and knee replacements,62'63 to receive anti-
retroviral therapy or prophylaxis for Pneumo-
cystis carinii pneumonia on first referral to an
HIV clinic,"M and to undergo surgical resection
for colorectal cancer (this difference was
found even after researchers controlled for
age, comorbidity, and extent and location of
tumor).65African Americans, regardless ofincome
level, are more likely than White patients to
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undergo procedures such as lower-limb ampu-
tation, bilateral orchiectomy, and cesarean
delivery.66 The authors of one study con-
cluded that their findings "suggest inappropri-
ate influences on clinical decision making that
would not be addressed by changes in reim-
bursement."67 Racial variations in cardiac care
have been the most well documented. Even
studies that control for disease severity, eco-
nomic and insurance status, and the presence
of comorbid conditions find that Blacks
receive less intensive cardiac care.6>74 In the
November 1997 issue of the Journal, H. Jack
Geiger mentioned an ongoing study that sug-
gests that the treatment disparities in cardiac
care cannot be attributed to patient preference,
"raising the probability that the differentials
are the result, instead, of covert or uncon-
scious racial stereotyping by physicians in
their assessment of patients' suitability for
such procedures.S54(Pl7I66)
Physicians are less effective at treating
patients who do not trust them. And it is
increasingly evident that African Americans
and other minority patients have strong
grounds for doubting both the goodwill and
the color blindness ofWhite medical practi-
tioners. The empirical evidence suggesting
differential medical treatment of minori-
ties, the suspicion based on historical expe-
rience, and anecdotal accounts from minority
patients combine to undermine the relation-
ship between White physicians and minority
patients, despite individual physicians' good-
will and regardless of whether the minority
patient's fears are correct in any individual
case. For example, African Americans are the
patient group most likely to distrust the care
they will receive at the end of life.75 By influ-
encing such factors as patterns of compli-
ance, preventive care, and patient disclosure
ofinformation and choice of therapies,43 such
distrust can have a substantial impact on the
care that minority patients receive. This sus-
picion is so deep-seated and widespread that,
in the short term, the only remedy is to pro-
vide minority patients with physicians with
whom they feel safe and comfortable.76
This justification for race-conscious
admissions policies does not represent an
attempt to remedy past wrongs or to help
aspiring medical students from disadvan-
taged backgrounds (although it may inciden-
tally do both). Instead, it is based on the
state's utilitarian interest in ensuring that
medical professionals can do theirjob. It does
not require evidence of past discrimination
against minority medical school applicants
and evidence ofthe current ill effects ofthose
wrongs. It does not require a link between the
victims of discrimination and the recipients
of preferential treatment. All it requires is
convincing evidence that African Americans
and other minorities have persistent and
deep fears that the color of their skin will
affect the care they receive from their doc-
tors and that those fears undermine the thera-
peutic alliance that should characterize the
doctor-patient relationship. Some such evi-
dence already exists, and more can be col-
lected both nationally and locally through
continuing studies of the way in which
minorities and the health care system inter-
act. This evidence might be marshaled to
convince courts considering the constitution-
ality of a medical school's admissions policy
that better health care is a compelling state
interest and that a racially diverse physician
workforce is the only effective means of sat-
isfying that interest.
Conclusion
Even if the courts accept this argu-
ment-and it is by no means certain that they
will-affirmative action supporters must still
win the political and public relations cam-
paign. Otherwise, even judicially sanctioned
affirmative action practices could be struck
down by legislative fiat or popular referen-
dum. The outcome ofthe political debate will
depend on how successfully supporters can
articulate the moral and social reasons why
affirmative action is justified, irrespective of
its constitutionality. Affirmative action poli-
cies might be justified morally and politically
as a form of compensatory justice, a repay-
ment of the debt owed to groups of individu-
als that have been wronged. They might also
be rationalized as a form of distributive jus-
tice, a way of ensuring that individuals from
disadvantaged groups receive a just distribu-
tion of society's goods and opportunities.
Compensatory and distributive justice argu-
ments are cogent and sufficiently strong to
convince some people of the need for affir-
mative action remedies.77'78
Politics, however, is the art of the possi-
ble. In the realm of political debate and
moral argument, a diversity-based utilitarian
goal is likely to garner more public support
than other justifications and thus will be
most helpful in answering and forestalling
further political attacks on affirmative
action. It does not raise the contentious
issues of blame and debt. Instead, the diver-
sity justification for affirmative action rests
on the more modest, but demonstrable, claim
that society has an interest in providing ade-
quate care to patients. The medical profes-
sion and the health care system will have to
win the trust of the minority community
before they can deliver health care in an
effective manner. For now, this trust can be
won only by substantially increasing the
number of minority physicians available for
minority patients. D
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